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Barbaruolo: Malicki v. Doe: Defining a Split of Authority Based on the State

NOTE
M4LICKI V DOE: DEFINING A SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY BASED ON THE STATE TORT
CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENT HIRING AND
SUPERVISION OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CLERGY
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Jurisdictions faced for the first time with the issue of whether the
First Amendment bars claims against religious institutions of negligent
hiring and negligent supervision of clergy will find conflicting precedent
on which to base their determination. The reason is that the Supreme
Court of the United States, as well as Congress, have not determined a
particular uniform position.' All litigation involving constitutional2
questions of law are difficult, and oftentimes tedious, to resolve.
Presumably, there has been no other area of the law in which litigation
has been as heated and diverse as the area of sexual misconduct by
clergy and the church's resulting legal liability, if any.3 In fact, claims of
sexual misconduct have ensued in both the context of injury to
parishioners by clerics, as well as misconduct directed toward other
employees of the church. In a matter where the Church faces possible
state interference with the fundamental right to freely exercise religion,
the waters surrounding this First Amendment consideration become
1. See McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 848 (N.J. 2002) (stating that all factual situations
involving civil lawsuits between the Church and parishioners, employees, and clergy have not been
uniformly defined by the Supreme Court of the United States).
2. See id. (stating that the issue at bar involved an area of the law in which Supreme Court
decisions proffer limited guidance as to future resolution and that there remains substantial doctrinal
uncertainty); see also Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995) ("It
is generally acknowledged that this area of First Amendment law is in flux and the United States
Supreme Court cases offer very limited guidance.") (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
3. See McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 845.
4. See id. (noting that this case involved sexual misconduct by one clergyman toward
another).
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opaque. The primary concern of this split of authority is two-fold. First,

will the State's interference cause an "excessive entanglement" 5 with the
religion's tenets and practices? Second, is the question of whether

religious institutions are immune from state tort claims based on the
sexual misconduct of the clergy justiciable? 6 In order to formulate an
intelligent response to these questions, courts initially faced with this

issue must balance the most convincing precedent favorable to their
view against fairness to the society.
The Florida Supreme Court has answered both of these questions
from an objective analytical viewpoint. 7 In Malicki v. Doe,8 the Florida

Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not prevent claims
of negligent hiring and supervision against the religious organizations
for the alleged misconduct of their clergy. While it recognized and

considered the opposing viewpoint on this issue, the court felt that it
would only be fair to society to allow these claims to proceed in the legal
system, at least past the initial pleading stage. 9 Additionally, the court's
critique of the opposing view is compelling to future case law in that it
provides an expansive overview of the most persuasive precedent in
support of their views on this issue. The dissent in Malicki v. Doe also
offers a spirited viewpoint on this issue, providing an analysis in stark
contrast to that of the majority.'0
This Note will recount, in Section II, the background to the religion
clauses of the First Amendment and how delicately the courts have
construed each. Section III will describe general tort principles with a
specific focus on the state tort claims of negligent hiring and

5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Supreme Court in Lemon devised
a three-prong test to determine whether a neutral law violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The third prong states, "the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion." See infra text accompanying notes 35-37. Recent cases examining the
Establishment Clause clarified that excessive entanglement is simply one factor to consider in
evaluating the second prong of the Lemon test-whether the primary effect of the law is to advance
or inhibit religion. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 794 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997).
6. Several authors have related the concept of "non-justiciability" to characterize religious
questions. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1236 (2d ed. 1988)

(characterizing religious questions as "non-justiciable"); Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the
Modern Constraints of the Establishment Clause: Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy,
Endorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 903, 905 (1992) (noting that "the
[Supreme] Court has forbidden judicial resolution of questions concerning a church's creed,
governance, or discipline," and finding that "[s]uch issues are, in effect, nonjusticiable").
7. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
8. See id. at 365.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 367 (Harding, J., dissenting).
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supervision. Section IV will describe the uncontested facts of Malicki v.
Doe, while discussing the procedural history, as well as, the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Section V will provide an extensive
look at both sides of the coin. Part A will discuss how the courts that
allow the First Amendment to act as a bar to litigation express their
opinion on this topic. Part B will provide the opposing viewpoint and
how the courts that adopted that view have explained their reasoning.
Section VI expands on Sections IV and V by discussing recent
developments since the Malicki decision. Lastly, Section VII will offer a
brief conclusion of this divided area of law and will also supply some
policy reasons that support the conclusion.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" On its face, the First
Amendment prohibits the adjudication of lawsuits that either directly or
indirectly require resolving religious-based questions, such as disputes
over religious tenets, practices, or ecclesiastical law.' 2 It has long been
recognized that the government, including the judicial system, may not
probe into the "truth, reasonableness, or validity" of a religious assertion
or belief.' 3 Essentially, the idea remains that the government is barred
from expressly inquiring into ecclesiastical matters with respect to some
degree of objective validity.' 4 In fact, the Supreme Court has steadfastly
refused to address, over the last several years, the adjudicability of
religious issues,' 5 despite substantial opportunity to do SO.16 In any
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion" has commonly been termed the "Establishment Clause," while " Congress shall make no
law.., prohibiting the free exercise thereof' has been coined the "Free Exercise Clause." However,
there have been arguments to the contrary, i.e., viewing these clauses as one uniform clause. See,
e.g.,
Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, StructuralFree Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 n.8
(1991); Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620,
627 (1992).
12. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection,75 IND. L.J. 219, 219 (2000).
13. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In applying the [F]ree
[E]xercise [C]lause of the First Amendment, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or
reasonableness of a claimant's religious beliefs."); see also Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910,
914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("American courts have no business endorsing or condemning the truth
or falsity of anyone's religious beliefs.").
14. See Idleman, supra note 12, at 221.
15. See Nathan Clay Belzer, Deference in the Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes:
The Lesser of Two ConstitutionalEvils, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 109, 112 (1998) (noting that "the
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event, the two primary religion clauses to the First Amendment each
play its own respective and pivotal role regarding the Supreme Court's
consistent hesitance to decide such potentially onerous matters. While
most courts agree that adjudication of religious questions is ultimately
rooted in the First Amendment, many courts disagree as to which clause
is appropriate. 17 Some courts give deference to the Free Exercise
Clause, 18 while others opt for the Establishment Clause, 19 and still others
seek the analysis through both Clauses.20
The Free Exercise Clause guarantees the absolute right to believe
and avow whatever religious tenet one desires. 21 The United States
Supreme Court has explained that while the freedom to believe is an
absolute concept, the freedom to act is not.22 The First Amendment has
never been interpreted to mean that "when otherwise prohibitable
conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the
convictions, but the conduct itself must be free from government
regulation." 23 Indeed, the state may regulate conduct through neutral
laws of general applicability, which need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest, 24 however, it must be established that
the conduct at issue was not rooted in religious beliefs and the law

Supreme Court has not addressed this issue [of adjudicating intrachurch disputes] since the [Jones

v.] Wolf decision in 1979" and that "[s]tate courts, therefore, have been the final arbiter of
intrachurch dispute resolution during the course of the last eighteen years").
16. See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 967 (1997); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928
P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997); Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee,
533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied,516 U.S. 1116 (1996).
17. See Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80-81 (D.R.I. 1997) (noting that courts have
grounded the doctrine in various aspects of the First Amendment, some opting for the Free Exercise

Clause, while others choose the Establishment Clause).
18.

See Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) (stating that the First

Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibits courts from considering claims requiring the
interpretation of religious tenets).

19. See Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. 2002) (applying Establishment Clause
analysis to various state tort claims).
20. See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
adjudicating several tort claims "would violate both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses");

F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997) (mixed Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
together by asserting that "a clergy malpractice claim will entangle courts with the First
Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion"); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 24647 (Mo. 1997) (noting that "excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of
inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment").
21. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
22. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
23. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
24. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
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25
regulating that conduct was neutral on its face and in its purpose.
Furthermore, the division between belief and conduct is justified in that
there are some practices that are considered so baneful that the state
cannot be apathetic to them.26 In such situations, free exercise should not
permit individuals to possess free rein in their conduct over others
merely because their "'consciences' [told] them to do so. ' ' 27 Plainly, the
First Amendment will not shield inappropriate sexual conduct, more
specifically-misconduct, exploitation, or coercion, from the
repercussions of tort liability, even within a religious setting.2 8 Courts
have adjudicated and upheld complete prohibitions on conduct specific
to a particular religion.29 Thus, once the court determines that the
essence of the lawsuit against a religious defendant is purely secular, the
court can resolve the matter through neutral principles of law.3 ° With
regard to tort liability, sexual misconduct can surely 31be viewed as
secular and be resolved utilizing neutral principles of law.
Alternatively, the Establishment Clause states that government
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." 32 One of the
primary purposes of the Establishment Clause is to ensure that a
religious organization is protected from arbitrary interference by federal
or state governments, whether such interference is to the religious
organizations' benefit or detriment.33 While religious institutions are
only afforded limited immunity from such interference, the courts cannot
adjudicate matters that, on their face, are entwined in religious tenets or

25. See id.
26. See Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice, & Sexual Abuse by
Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 45, 71 (2001).
27. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
28. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1134-35 (D. Mass. 1982)
("[T]he free exercise clause of the First Amendment would not immunize it from all common law
causes of action alleging tortious activity.").
29. See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (upholding regulation
prohibiting the ingestion of sacramental peyote); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986)
(upholding military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (upholding law that required the Amish to violate the practices of their
faith by participating in the social security system).
30. See generallySmith, 494 U.S. 872; F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. 1997);
Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992).
31. See Fenton, supranote 26, at 74.
32. U.S CONST. amend. I.
33. See Faye M. Hammersley, Comment, Reconciling L.L.N. v. Clauder and Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee: Does This Mean Blanket Immunity for Religious Organizations?,81
MARQ. L. REv. 611, 623 (1998). It has been recognized that the purpose of the Establishment
Clause is to prohibit a state from aiding or otherwise promoting religion, or from favoring one
religious organization over another. See Fenton, supra note 26, at 75.
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doctrines, i.e., ecclesiastical matters. 34 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman provided a three-part test to determine whether a
neutral law violates the Establishment Clause: "First the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second the principle or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits a religion; and finally the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion. 3 5 If the government can satisfy each prong of this test then its
action will be valid.36 By far the most adjudicated and widely
controversial prong of the Lemon test is that the law "must not foster an
'excessive government entanglement with religion."' 37 Essentially, this
prong stringently asserts that courts must be wholeheartedly avoidant of
any inquiry into the truth or falsity of particular religious tenets or
beliefs.3 8 In fact, unless the issue that relates to internal church affairs
can be applied with neutral rules of law that demonstrate purely secular
behavior, courts are without authority to review and resolve those
controversies. 39
The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Wolf,4 ° formulated a "neutral
principles" 41 approach for determining whether a court is excessively
entangled in religious tenets. While the dispute in that case was
regarding real property rather than state tort claims, the Court,
nevertheless, was presented with the issue of whether civil courts could
resolve the dispute on the basis of neutral principles of law, or whether
they must defer to the resolution of an authoritative tribunal of an
ecclesiastical affiliation.42 The Supreme Court essentially found that if
an issue is wholly secular in operation, a court may apply neutral
principles of law.4 3 However, if resolution of the controversy is rooted in
deep-seated religious doctrines, then a court must defer the resolution of
that controversy to an appropriate religious entity. 44 Therefore, the Court
stated that civil courts could adjudicate these matters via neutral
principles of law by engaging in the narrowest form of judicial review,
34. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 623.
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
36. See id. at 613-14.
37. Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
38. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
39. See Fenton, supra note 26, at 74.
40. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
41. Id.at 601.
42. See id.at 597 (implying that such a determination must be carefully rendered since
deference to a "tribunal of a hierarchical church" may be imperative).
43. See id.
at 602-03.
44. See id.
at 604.
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provided that the court does not inquire into any substantive
ecclesiastical doctrine.45
Quite a division has formed among those cases and commentaries
that have addressed the issue of whether, if any, the religion clauses may
act as a bar to state tort claims against religious organizations. While this
split of opinion will be discussed more fully in Section V, it is important
to introduce some elementary comments regarding it. The religion
clauses have been applied, both individually and collectively, to various
state tort causes of action.46 It has been stated that to hold a religious
institution responsible for the misconduct of its cleric, based upon
general principles of state tort law, is not in violation of the
Establishment Clause since that clause deals precisely with the
promotion of religion.4 7 Conversely, the more apt clause to examine
such claims is the Free Exercise Clause. 48 This assertion is far from
accurate since many of the decided cases in this area of law have relied
as much on the Establishment Clause as they have on the Free Exercise
Clause.49
A further reason for such a divide is that many courts and
commentators assert that it would be impossible for a court or jury to
determine a negligence action without first ascertaining whether the
cleric acted like a reasonably prudent cleric would in the same or similar
situation. 50 The problem with this determination is that some courts view
45. See id. at 607 (stating that judicial review of a religious organization's decision must be
narrowly construed and a court must not probe into whether a religious entity is following its own
practices); see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712-15 (1976)
(forbidding judicial review of whether the religious organization's tribunal properly followed its
own procedure in removing a bishop from office).
46. These causes of action consist of clergy malpractice, respondeat superior, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligent hiring and retention, negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotion
distress, and tortious interference with contract. Most relevant to the discussion in this Note is the
state tort claims of negligent hiring and negligent supervision. See, e.g., Idleman, supranote 12, at
234-37; Hammersley, supra note 33, at 625-35.
47. See Fenton, supra note 26, at 75.
48. See id
49. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 357 (Fla. 2002) (applying the Establishment Clause
to reach its conclusion); Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d
426, 441 (Minn. 2002) (court utilized the excessive entanglement approach under the Establishment
Clause in its analysis); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997) (stating that excessive
entanglement between church and state could arise as a result of adjudicating state tort actions);
Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference of the United Methodist Church, 923 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting the contention that the Establishment Clause bars state tort claims); see
also Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that adjudicating tort
claims would result in excessive entanglement between the church and state).
50. Some courts have attempted to establish a standard of care that a religious institution owes
to its parishioners. See Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liability for Negligent
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such an inquiry as probing into the ecclesiastical matters of the church,
while others view this as a purely secular inquiry. 51 Briefly, the
arguments for each side can be summed up as follows. Those courts that
view tort claims against religious institutions as secular have based their
conclusions on the fact that tort law is neutral to the extent that it is
intended neither to repress religious practices nor selectively to burden
religiously inspired behavior. However, those courts that are of the
opinion that tort claims invade into ecclesiastical practices are more
inclined to conclude that such inquiry is wholly violative of the
constitutionally protected religious faith and doctrines. These arguments
will ram heads more fully in Section V.
III.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF RELATED TORT PRINCIPLES

Sexual misconduct among clergy members is a rare but disturbing
societal occurrence, which is made more evident by animated news
reporting. It is routine for tort plaintiffs, typically parishioners who are
involved in clergy misconduct cases, to file suit against the institutional
church in addition to the allegedly liable cleric(s).52 The impetus behind
this action can be attributed to the common motto among plaintiff
lawyers: go for the deeper pocket. Since religious organizations are
likely to have insurance and assets, they are more inclined to be sued in
conjunction with the commonly impoverished cleric.53 However,
plaintiff lawyers certainly have acknowledged the difficulty in procuring
settlements with the insurance carriers since, in order to recover, they
must claim that the religious organization was negligent.54 A core
conflict with such a claim arises from the measurement of duty and
reasonableness that is needed to establish negligence and the potential
for it to excessively entangle the courts in the nuances of the religion's
tenets and beliefs.55 It is from this careful inquiry that various theories of
tort liability have been asserted. While several theories may be

Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. REV. 97, 100-03 (1991); see also Hammersley,
supra note 33, at 626. It would be almost impossible for a court to attach a standard of care on

religious institutions since it would essentially be creating, for example, a "reasonable bishop"
standard. This would require the courts to interpret religious tenets and practices in rendering a
decision. See id.
51. For example, see supra note 45.
52. See James T. O'Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the
Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31, 38 (1994).

53.

See id.

54.

See id. at 39.

55. See id.
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mentioned, the focus of this Note is on the negligence in hiring and
supervision causes of action.
Generally, claims that religious institutions are liable for the
misconduct of its clergy can be asserted vicariously, under the theory of
respondeat superior.5 6 This doctrine is an established theory of liability
under which organizational control and supervision is a basis for
allocating the risk of damages to the organization.5 7 Fundamentally, the
religious organization would be liable for the torts of its employees, i.e.
the clergy, if the employees were acting within the scope of their
employment. However, the difficulty in proving this transfer of liability
is that sexual misconduct is almost certainly never within the scope of
the cleric's employment. 8 For example, in Destefano v. Grabrian, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim based on
respondeat superior.5 9 In that case, the misconduct occurred when the

priest allegedly engaged in consensual sexual behavior during marriage
counseling. 60 The court held that the priest's acts were outside the scope
of his employment. 6 1 The court reasoned that a violation of the ordained
priest's vow of celibacy is antithetical to the doctrines of the Catholic
faith, and sexual intercourse is certainly not customary or within the
62
description of the priest's duties.
One of the most common theories of recovery is negligent hiring
and retention. Typically, a plaintiff must establish that a religious
organization was negligent in hiring a member of the clergy because he
or she was otherwise incompetent. 63 Since negligence 64 is a state-based
cause of action, the test to determine liability will vary among states.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Missouri set forth a suitable twoprong test, which a plaintiff must satisfy in order to prove a claim for
negligent hiring. 65 First, the plaintiff must evince that "the employer
knew or should have known of the employee's dangerous proclivities. 66
In the context of sexual misconduct by clergy, the employer will be
56. See id
57. See id.
58. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 628.
59. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 288 (Colo. 1988).
60. See id.
at278.
61. Seeid. at287.
62. See id.
63. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 629.
64. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997) ("Negligence is 'conduct which
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm."') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965)).
65. See id.
66. Id.
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regarded as the governing religious organization. This first prong is
seemingly laborious to prove in that the religious organization should
have known something about the cleric(s) that would have prevented a
reasonable person in a similar situation from hiring them. 67 This
situation is analogous to a school district's liability for negligently
employing a pedophile teacher.6 8 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that "the employer's negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.' 6 9
Presumably, whether a court permits a negligent hiring and
retention claim depends upon whether a court is convinced that the
religious organizations' conduct is separable from their religious
principles. 70 It is arguable that any adjudication of this cause of action
will require an examination into the hiring policies of the religious
organization and thus, involve excessive entanglement in church
operations on the part of the government. 7' To maintain the autonomy of
religious organizations, several courts have declined to recognize the
adjudicability of this tort since inquiring into the reasonableness of
sacerdotal activities would touch upon First Amendment protections.72
Essentially, such inquiry into the reasonableness of ecclesiastical
conduct would permit approval of one model of church hiring over
another, thereby solidifying the excessive entanglement by courts in
church operations.73 Notwithstanding that view, several courts have held
that judicial review may be procured with respect to a party's claim that
a religious organization negligently hired one of its clergymen without
implicating the First Amendment.7 4
Alternatively, negligent supervision may be defined as liability
resulting from an individual's (or in this case, an organization's)
negligence or recklessness in the supervision of the activities of his, her
or its employees.7 5 This tort imposes a limited responsibility on an
67.

See O'Reilly & Strasser, supranote 52, at 43.

68. See id.
69. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 246; see also Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F.

Supp. 2d 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Southern District of New York established that a claim for
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, under New York law, must entail a showing by the
plaintiff that "the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the
conduct which caused the injury." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 629-30.
71. See id.at 630.
72. See Ryan G. Lee, Comment, Employing the Section 5 Enforcement Power to Guarantee
Religious Freedom in the State Courts, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 1025, 1040 (2002).
73. See id. at 1041.
74. See Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1324 (Colo. 1996).

75.

See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 630.
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employer to control an employee for the safety of a third person, even
when the employee is acting outside the scope of employment.76 Based
on that principle, if an employee, such as a cleric, is negligent or
reckless, the employer will be liable for negligent supervision providing
that the employer knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
employee posed an unreasonable risk of harm to others." Akin to the
tort of negligent hiring, this tort also falls under the guise of First
Amendment suspicion. In other words, while some courts have refused
to permit negligent supervision claims to proceed through the legal
system for the fear of excessive entanglement with the religious
organizations, other courts have allowed such claims due to an analysis
based on neutral principles of law.78 For instance, the Supreme Court of
Maine, in Swanson v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,ardently
stated that when a court attempts to compare the ecclesiastical
relationship between a religious organization and its clergy with the
agency relationship of the business world, there exists a great potential
for a constitutional violation since secular duties will surely be brought
into the ecclesiastical relationship. 79 Hence, imposing secular duties and
liability on the religious organization as a "principle" will infringe upon
its freedom to decide the standards governing the relationship among
80
"the church, its bishop, and the parish priest.'
On the flip side, the application of neutral principles of law has
emerged as the more persuasive of the two views. When the facts of a
particular case dictate that the supervisory interest is purely secular, a
civil court may permit a negligent supervision claim. 81 So,
hypothetically speaking, if a priest were assigned to instruct a physical
education class and the governing religious organization was aware of
the priest's dangerous propensities, then the organization would be liable
for negligent supervision if the priest were to harm a student. Moreover,
negligent supervision claims do not conflict with the Free Exercise
Clause since judicially permitting such a claim is the least intrusive

76.
77.

See S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 176 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
See id.at 177.

78. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 632. The "neutral principles of law" approach was
discussed, supra in Section I1.
79. See Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441,444 (Me. 1997).
80. Id. at 445; see also Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791 (Wis.
1995) (stating that problems of excessive entanglement are inevitable if a court is required to
decipher whether a priest, minister, or rabbi was on or off duty when that religious figure engaged in
misconduct beyond the scope of his duties).
81.

See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 633.
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means a state can utilize to enforce a compelling state interest.8 2 The
rationale behind this theory is that the church is not precluded from
having religious freedom to hire and retain whomever it wants. 83 Rather,
the only requirement this theory imposes on the church is to remove any
and all clerics that the church knows or reasonably should know is a
potential sexual deviant from any position in which misconduct may
occur. 84 The reasonableness of this determination, while still subject to
judicial intervention, is minimally intrusive and can be limited to
decisions that are purely secular.85 In which case it is imperative that the
church be held liable for such supervisory decisions and not be able to
conceal itself under a blanket of immunity for such a claim.8 6 The
substantive difference between negligent 87 hiring and negligent
supervision is discussed in detail in Section IV.
Although less prevalent than the torts of negligence in hiring and
supervision, there are other causes of action under which a religious
organization could be held accountable for the sexual misconduct of its
clergymen. 88 For instance, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held a church
liable for the misconduct of a minister by allowing a female minister to
file a sexual harassment lawsuit under Minnesota's human rights
statute. 89 A claim for breach of fiduciary duty 9° is also commonly
asserted against religious organizations. 91 Several courts have held that
clerics who have the apparent authority to perform secular duties within
the congregation, such as marriage counseling, owe their parishioners a
fiduciary duty. 92 If the cleric breaches that fiduciary duty by engaging in
misconduct, the cleric and his religious organization may be subject to
tort liability.93 In such cases, when the claims arise from secular conduct,
courts typically adjudicate the issue under a "neutral principles of law"
82. See id. (stating that the encouragement of religious organizations to prevent a cleric's
cycle of repeated sexual misconduct is certainly a compelling state interest); see also supra note 24.
83. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 634.
84. See id. The sub-requirement is that the religious organization may not transfer the cleric to
a different parish as a solution to the problem. Rather, there has been suggestion of mandatory
reporting statutes for religious organizations. See id. at 651.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 634-35.
87. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 46.
89. See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 717-18, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
90. See, e.g., Mirick v. McClellan, No. C-930099, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816, at *14 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1994) ("A fiduciary is one who, by the undertaking, has the duty to act primarily
for the benefit of another.").
91. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 628.
92. See Lee, supra note 72, at 1041-42.
93. See id. at 1042.
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analysis. 94 In sum, since religious organizations are not absolutely
immunized from tort liability, it is not uncommon to hold such
organizations liable for claims arising from negligence, malpractice and
breaches of fiduciary duty.95
96
IV. BACKGROUND TO MALJCKI v. DOE

Lawsuits that are brought by parishioners against the Catholic
Church evince many of the same claims. Among these claims are the
alleged torts of negligent hiring and negligent supervision by the
church.9 7 However, the conflict that arises when these state tort claims
are brought is a result of the split of authority allowing the church to use
the First Amendment as a shield to avoid liability. This is the primary
issue that the petitioners in Malicki v. Doe sought to resolve. This
section will detail the facts of the case, as recounted by the Florida
Supreme Court, and assess the procedural history that led to the appeal.
There will be an explanation of the lower court's opinion as well as an
explanation of the holding and reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court.
A.

The Facts of Malicki v. Doe

Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II ("parishioners") jointly brought a
lawsuit against Father Jan Malicki, the Archdiocese of Miami and St.
David Catholic Church ("St. David's"). 98 The parishioners alleged that at
the time of the occurrence Jane Doe I was a minor parishioner who
worked at St. David's in return for her tuition to attend St. Thomas
Catholic High School, and Jane Doe II was an adult parishioner who was
employed at St. David's and was under the direct supervision and
control of Malicki, the Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's.99 The
parishioners alleged that they were "fondled, molested, touched, abused,
sexually assaulted and/or battered" by Malicki on numerous
occasions.100 Additionally, Malicki was claimed to have served alcohol
to minor Jane Doe 1.101 Counts I and II of the parishioners' complaint
alleged claims of negligent hiring and negligent supervision against the

94.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997).

See Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
See supra note 46.
See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 352.
See id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
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10 2
Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's based on Malicki's conduct.
Essentially, the parishioners claimed that the Archdiocese of Miami and
St. David's "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known, [that Malicki] was unsuited for teaching, counseling, spiritually
03
guiding, supervising and leading employees and parishioners."'
Furthermore, the parishioners asserted that prior to employing Malicki in
the capacity of Associate Pastor, the Archdiocese of Miami and St.
David's negligently failed to inquire into Malicki's background,
reputation, work history, qualifications, and/or criminal history. 1°4
Lastly, the parishioners maintained that the Archdiocese of Miami and
St. David's were negligent in placing the parishioners under the
supervision of Malicki when they knew or should have known that
Malicki had the propensity to commit a sexual assault. 10 5 The
Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's moved to dismiss the
parishioners' complaint, pertinent to counts I and II, arguing that
resolving these issues would "involve the internal ecclesiastical
required by Canon Law,"
decisions of the Roman Catholic Church
10 6
which is barred by the First Amendment.

B. Lower Court Opinion
The trial court arrived at only the First Amendment argument and
entered an order that granted the Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's
motion to dismiss with prejudice. 10 7 The court concluded that the First
Amendment served as a bar to the parishioners' claims. 108 On appeal, the
Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, reversed the trial court's
decision. 10 9 The Third District determined that the issue to be decided
was whether the Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's should have
known about Malicki's misconduct and did nothing to prevent the
parishioners from being inflicted with reasonably foreseeable" 0° harm."'

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
See id.
See Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Foreseeable risks are the "risks by reason of which the actor's conduct is held to be

negligent." W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 273 (5th ed.,

1984). In the negligence context, reasonable foreseeability is typically the guidepost for whether the
actor's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See id. at 274. However, it is
imperative to note that if one could not reasonably foresee any resulting injury, then those
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Ultimately, the Third District held that the First Amendment did not bar
consideration of the parishioners' claims since the determination of this
issue is one governed by state tort law and thus does not require any
inquiry into the religious tenets or practices of the Roman Catholic
Church." 2
Conversely, Chief Judge Schwartz wrote a spirited dissent in which
he stated that it was erroneous to compare "the relationships between the
church, its bishops and its priests [ ] and any consequent tort
responsibility for hiring, firing, retention and assignment ...to those
involving, say, a landlord and the custodian to whom it entrusts the keys
to his tenants' apartments."' 1 3 Chief Judge Schwartz reasoned that it
would be unconstitutional to require the church to abide by the duty of
care of a reasonable church and implausible for the Archdiocese of
Miami and St. David's to be held to the standard of a reasonable
business person. 14 Chief Judge Schwartz agreed with the trial court and
concluded that the First Amendment is a bar 1to5 the parishioners' claims
of negligent hiring and negligent supervision.!
C. Holding and Analysis of the Supreme Court of Florida
1. The Majority Opinion
On appeal from the trial court, the Third District Court of Appeals
framed the issue as whether the First Amendment bars a secular court's
consideration of the parishioners' claims of negligent hiring and
negligent supervision against the Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's
based upon Malicki's misconduct in which the harm that would be
inflicted upon the parishioners was reasonably foreseeable."16 The Third
District held that the First Amendment was not a bar to the parishioners'

unforeseeable consequences would not rise to the level of actionable negligence. See id.at 280; see
also Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 74-75 (D. Conn. 1995). The test
for reasonably foreseeable harm in the context of negligence is whether an ordinarily prudent person
in the same or similar position as the defendant, either knowing what he knew or reasonably should
have known, could have anticipated that the harm that occurred was likely to result-the so-called
proximate cause of the injury. See id; see also Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 362 (stating that the "core
predicate for imposing liability is one of reasonable foreseeability-the cornerstone of our tort
law").
111. See Malicki, 771 So. 2d at 548.
112. See id.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
114. Seeid. at550.
115. See id.
116. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 353 (Fla. 2002).
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claims' 17 and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed." 18 In its holding,
the Supreme Court of Florida balanced the two relevant clauses of the
First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause, with the contrasting case law formulating the split of authority
on this issue.
Although several Supreme Court Justices have manifested their
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, the Majority in Malicki v. Doe stated
that it will continue to apply the test until the Supreme Court decides a
different test." 9 The majority further stated that it must determine
"whether the dispute [was] an ecclesiastical one about 'discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law ' " 120 in which
the First Amendment may act as a bar to those claims or whether it is a
case simply involving a religious institution in a purely secular dispute
with a third party in which the First Amendment may not act as a bar to
the claims. 12 1 To decide this, the majority sought direction from the split
of authority on this issue, 122 which will be discussed in a subsequent
section. 123
Ultimately, the majority rejected the position that the First
Amendment serves as a bar to the adjudication of the dispute since this
case is not an internal church matter.124 More accurately stated, the basis
for the dispute is the allegation of negligence by the Archdiocese 1of
25
Miami and St. David's for the hiring and supervision of Malicki.
Further, the majority acknowledged that no greater or lesser deference is
given to tortious conduct committed on third parties by religious
organizations than is given to tortious conduct committed on third
parties by non-religious organizations. 126 This notion is exemplified in
the case at bar since the parishioners' cause of action for negligent hiring
and supervision is based on neutral
application of principles of tort law
27
and not rooted in religious belief. 1

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Malicki, 771 So. 2d at 548.
See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 365.
See id at 355 n.5.
Id. at 357 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id.
See infra Part V.
See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 360.
See id.
See id. at 361.
See id.
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In any event, the majority defined the elements required to support
a prima facie case for negligent hiring. 12 8 The majority explained that the
three elements required are as follows:
(1)
the employer was required to make an appropriate investigation of
the employee and failed to do so; (2) an appropriate investigation
would have revealed the unsuitability of the employee for the
particular duty to be performed or for employment in general; and
(3) it was unreasonable for the employer to hire the29employee in light
of the information he knew or should have known. 1
The primary distinction between the tort of negligent hiring and that
of negligent supervision, as the majority points out, concerns the pointin-time at which the employer should have known about the employee's
ineptness. 130 The claim for negligent hiring occurs prior to employment,
while the claim for negligent supervision occurs after the employment
commences.1 31 These claims are brightly highlighted in Malicki, where
the parishioners asserted that the Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's
negligently failed to inquire into "'Malicki's background, qualifications,
reputation, work history, and/or criminal history prior to employing him
in the capacity of Associate Pastor."" 32 Additionally, the parishioners
further alleged that the Archdiocese of Miami and St. David's were
negligent in their supervision of Malicki since they should have known
about Malicki's inappropriate propensities. 133 However, the essence of
tort liability falls within the bounds of reasonable foreseeability., 34 Since
the claim of negligent hiring is brought after the employee has harmed
the third party through his or her scope of employment, the court looks
to whether the specific danger that occurred could have reasonably been
foreseen at the time of the hiring. 135 The majority decided that the
actions of Malicki were foreseeable and concluded that the Free Exercise
Clause does not bar consideration
of the parishioners' claims for
136
supervision.
and
hiring
negligent
The majority further added that the Establishment Clause does not
bar the parishioners' claims because the purpose of imposing tort

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
at 362.
Id. (quoting Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
Seeid. at352n.1S.
See id.
Id.at 362.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.at 364.
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liability based on the allegations in this case neither inhibits nor
advances religion, but rather it is a neutral principle of tort law.' 37 The
court reasoned that the possibility of excessive entanglement in internal
church affairs or in the explanation of religious tenets was
unforeseeable.' 38 In sum, the court concluded that the First Amendment
does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid liability for
harm resulting from misconduct of the clergy. 139 Moreover, it was
expressly noted that this holding is only to prevent the First Amendment
from barring cases from further litigation during the initial pleading
stage. 140 While only in dicta, the court asserted that there is a wide split
of authority on this topic and its holding only represents one possible
view. 14 1 This split of authority will be fully discussed in Section V.
2. The Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Wells opined that while the substance of the
majority's holding is accurate, the basis for it is grounded in ambiguous
and undefined language which will cause the religious organizations to
be "severely financially burdened"' 142 by having to repeatedly defend
those claims amounting to the equivocal "tortious conduct"' 143 as stated
by the majority. Although Chief Justice Wells asserted that he does not
condone such abusive behavior, his concern is that because the
vagueness of such language does not define the elements of any torts
which are actionable for such conduct, the religious organizations which
provide affordable counseling services will be burdened.' 44 Slightly
opposing this view, Justice Quince specially concurred to mention that
these religious organizations will not be burdened since they all carry
insurance to defend against claims based upon the acts of their
employees. 145 Furthermore, Justice Quince reiterated the majority's
opinion and stated that even though religious organizations may have to
defend against these claims repeatedly, entirely shielding them from tort
liability because of their status would have the impermissible effect of
146
acknowledging a religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 365.
See id.
Seeid.at365n.19.
Id. at 366 (Wells, C.J., concurring).

143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144.
145.
146.

See id.
See id. at 367 (Quince, J., concurring).
See id.
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Thus, such a recognition of religion would transgress the integrity of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 147 as well as, Article
I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. 148 Essentially, the hard and fast
lesson that this concurrence is attempting to teach is that the First
Amendment should not serve as a bar to a claim resulting from a tort that
does not excessively entangle the practices or tenets of the religion
regardless of how frequently the church must defend against such
lawsuits.
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Opposing the majority's decision, Justice Harding opined that
allowing a claim for negligent hiring and supervision against a religious
organization would surely require a court to intrude into the
organization's laws, tenets, and practices.149 An intrusion of this sort
would equal the excessive entanglement of religion by the state, and
thus, the claim would be barred by the First Amendment. 150 Justice
Harding argued that the majority overlooked the incontrovertible and
constitutionally improper result that allowing such a tort claim would
cause the courts to develop a standard of care for members of the clergy
despite the variety of religions asserting widely varying beliefs. 15' In
essence, judicial inquiry into the hiring and supervising of clergy would
result in the recommendation of religion by approving one model for
church hiring and supervising. 152 The dissent specifically states that the
majority's decision is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's opinion
in that the First Amendment provides churches with the "power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church
' 53
government, as well as those of faith and doctrine."'
Justice Harding strongly contends that, in the instant case, the
nature of the dispute is not just between a church and a third party, but
147. See id.
148. See id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or
penalizing the free exercise thereof Religious freedom shall not justify practices
inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or
indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian
institution.)
149. See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 367 (Harding, J., dissenting).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 367-68.
152. See Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
153. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 368 n.21 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952)) (emphasis omitted).
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rather an examination into "'intra-church' process and procedure," a
practice prohibited by the First Amendment. 54 Furthermore, the dissent
points to Schmidt v. Bishop1 55 to demonstrate that inquiring into the
hiring and supervising practices of the Archdiocese of Miami and St.
David's will raise First Amendment problems of excessive entanglement
and could require the court to make sensitive judgments regarding the
decorum of the Archdiocese and St. David's supervision in light of their
religious beliefs. 56 Additionally, any damages that may be awarded will
create a chilling effect leading indirectly to control by the state over the
future conduct of affairs of a religious organization, which is wholly in
violation of the Establishment Clause.157 Importantly, the dissent raised
many persuasive arguments that comprise the view taken in opposition
to the majority's view. In the next section, the clash of these two
separate views will be contrasted and discussed.
V.

DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT SERVE AS A BAR TO CLAIMS OF
NEGLIGENT HIRING AND SUPERVISION?

In recent years, several jurisdictions have encountered the issue of a
religious organization's liability in response to increased litigation
emanating from accusations of sexual misconduct by ecclesiastical
figures. 58 The case law involving this issue is highly varying. In fact,
the split of authority may be divided equally into two halves: one view
allowing the First Amendment to serve as a bar to such tort claims as
negligent hiring and supervision, and the other view preventing the First
Amendment to serve as a bar to those claims. However, given the
delicate balance between the protection of public safety and religious
freedom, there is considerable variety in the judicial analysis exercised
by the several courts. 159 Since the Supreme Court has not provided any
clear rule on this issue, 160 the contrasting views 161 will be discussed in

the immediate section.
154. Id. at 368 (emphasis omitted).
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
See id. at 332.
See id.
See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 358.
See id.
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
See S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing that resolution of

this issue has, in no way, been uniform between or within the jurisdictions that have considered it);
see also Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 377 (Fla. 2002) (outlining cases that address claims of
negligent supervision and the First Amendment and concluding that the First Amendment does not
serve as a bar to negligent hiring and supervision claims against the Church); Swanson v. Roman
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Case Law Allowing the FirstAmendment to Bar Tort Claims of
Negligent Hiringand Negligent Supervision

Consistent with the dissenting opinion in Malicki v. Doe, many
courts have held that the First Amendment acts as a bar to the tort claims
of negligent hiring and supervision by religious institutions for the
misconduct of their clergy. 162 A repetitive theme from case law
supporting this view is that allowing such tort claims to be brought will
infringe upon the tenets and practices of the religion and thus cause
excessive entanglement, incompatible with the history and purpose of
the First Amendment. The court in Schmidt v. Bishop provided an
insightful comment concerning the allowance of a lawsuit against 63a
religious institution based on negligence in hiring and supervision.'
That court explained that before allowing such torts to be actionable,
future cases must be taken into consideration since this tort is newly
invented and may lead to a slippery slope of future litigation. 64 Other
Federal cases, such as Dausch v. Rykse 165 and Ayon v. Gourley,166 have
also taken the view that the First Amendment serves as a bar to litigation
for claims of negligent hiring and supervision against a religious
institution for the misconduct of its clergy. One of the main difficulties
in barring these lawsuits is determining when the parishioners' claims of
negligence on behalf of the religious institution is intertwined with the
actual religious beliefs and practices of that religion.167 In particular, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the First Amendment barred these
claims since, in order for the parishioner to prove a prima facie case; she

Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1997) (holding that the First Amendment
barred a negligent supervision claim against the church); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 24648 (Mo. 1997) (holding that First Amendment barred negligent hiring and supervisions claims
against the Church); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Wis. 1997) (reversing a lower court's
decision on whether the First Amendment acts as a bar to a negligent supervision claim).
162. See infra notes 163-201.
163. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
164. See id.
165. 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994). In that case, the parishioner claimed that the pastor provided
secular counseling and forced the parishioner to have sex with him as part of the therapy. See id. at
1427. The Circuit Court held that the First Amendment barred the parishioner's negligence in hiring
and supervision claims against the church since "adjudication of such claims would foster excessive
state entanglement with religion." Id. at 1429.
166. No. 98-1305, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14199 (10th Cir. June 25, 1999). In that case, the
plaintiff sued the church under such legal theories as negligence in hiring and supervision. See id. at
*3. The plaintiff contended that he was sexually molested and abused on numerous occasions while
he was a minor parishioner. See id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
barred the plaintiff s negligence claims against the church. See id at *19.
167. See infra text accompanying note 199.
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69
8
would have to prove that the clergyman was unfit 16 for his position.
However, the United States Constitution prevents courts from
determining what makes a Catholic priest competent because "such a
determination would require interpretation of church canons and internal
church policies and practices., 170 As a result of this long-standing
principle, the plaintiff's negligence in hiring cause of action against the
Archdiocese, in Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, was incapable of
judicial enforcement. 171 Furthermore, regardless of whether the issue
involves negligent hiring or negligent supervision, both torts are barred
by the First Amendment, even though the supervision of the clergy
might be able to be decided without any interpretation of church laws or
72

tenets.

The Supreme Court of Maine made a persuasive argument in its
7 3 that
holding of Swanson v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland'
allowed for the First Amendment to serve as a bar to those tort claims. In
Swanson, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, approached their parish priest
about remarrying in a Catholic ceremony. 174 The priest dissuaded the
wife to do so, and subsequently initiated a sexual relationship with
her. 175 Upon discovery of the adulterous relationship by the husband, the
couple commenced divorce proceedings. 176 Collectively, the plaintiffs
sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland claiming that the church
was liable for negligently hiring and supervising its clergy. 77 The court
found that because of the constitutionally safeguarded beliefs governing
ecclesiastical relationships, the clergy cannot be treated the same as a
common employee. 178 Accordingly, the court maintained that to import
agency precepts broadly into church management and to impose liability
for any aberration from the secular standard is to impede the free
exercise of religion and to regulate religious governance. 79 In addition,
the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has consistently held
168. In this circumstance, proving the cleric to be unfit for his ecclesiastical position requires
probing into the doctrines of the particular religious sect and thus establishing a reasonable standard
of care for that religious position. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
169. See Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
See
See
692
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 791.
A.2d 441 (Me. 1997).
id.at 442.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 445.
id.
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that the religion clauses of the First Amendment require a balancing of
interests, but concluded that some rights are "not sufficiently compelling
to overcome certain religious interests" and that to impose a secular duty
of supervision on a religious organization would serve no sufficient
societal interest.1 80 This is a strong assertion that outlines the primary
argument that allowing these claims to proceed in litigation will promote
a slippery slope of vexatious lawsuits. While the courts are deeply
concerned about the best interests of society, the courts are even more
careful about not allowing claims that will create a sinkhole to further
frivolous litigation, in this case, permitting claims for negligent hiring
and supervision over the defense of the First Amendment.
There is a common pattern among all the case law that hold the
First Amendment to bar tort claims of negligence in hiring and
supervision by religious institutions: the courts do not want a conflict to
arise where the state can begin to exercise substantial control over
religions.18' The rationale of most courts appears to arise from the fact
that the freedom to exercise religious beliefs and practices has been
deeply rooted in our nation's history and to require a court to inquire
into such beliefs and practices would start us down- a slippery slope.
Moreover, when a court is presented with a complex issue, if that issue
may be resolved without deciding a constitutional question, the court
will do so at almost all costs.1 82 Since the courts that are faced with
negligent hiring and/or supervision claims against religious
organizations are often plagued with these complex and burdensome
First Amendment issues, two primary questions must ordinarily be
answered. 83 First, if either of these claims were allowed to advance,
would there be interference with the Church's right to free exercise of
their religion? 84 Second, could either of these claims be resolved
without interpreting canon law and religious tenets? 85 The courts that
answer both of these questions in the affirmative often allow the First
Amendment to be a defense to these claims. For instance, a court that
views the opportunity for an individual to serve as part of the clergy as
one of the most fundamental rights pertaining to a religious institution as
well as one of the most important exercises of a church's freedom from

180. Id. (quoting Minker v. Bait. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
181. See Lee, supra note 72, at 1038-39.
182. See L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 447 (Wis. 1997) (Bablitch, J., concurring).
183. See Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1249-50 (D. Colo. 1998).
184. See id.
185. See id.
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government control will often hold that inquiry into such will violate
both religion clauses of the First Amendment.' 86 Such examination of
these deep-seated rights to determine the87reasonableness of the church is
rejected by the courts holding this view.'
Similar among the parishioners' claims for negligent hiring and
supervision is the magnitude of the alleged incident. Although the claims
are mostly concerning the sexual misconduct of the clergy, the severity
of each situation may vary greatly from consensual1 88 to nonconsensual,189 as well as whether the conduct was engaged in with an
adult' 90 or with a minor.19 1 Additionally, these allegations commonly
92 school environment,' 93
arise as a result of a counseling relationship,
and through a social trust. 194 Such misconduct has often been termed
186. See id; see also generally Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (First Amendment bars claim for negligent hiring regardless if the church hires per se or the
hiring of school personnel for a church-run school.).
187. SeeAyon, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
188. See, e.g., Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (parishioner
plaintiffs voluntarily entered into a relationship with the cleric defendant that was sexual in nature);
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (parishioner engaged in a sexual
relationship with cleric since parishioner believed that it "was a special relationship and that there
was nothing wrong with it") (internal quotation marks omitted); S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 175-76
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (temple member engaged in sexual intercourse with the grandmaster
multiple times believing that the intercourse was a blessing that would save her life); Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Wis. 1995) (parishioner entered into a six-year
sexual relationship with a priest).
189. See, e.g., Doe v. Buongirno, No. CV000124271S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2613, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 30, 2002) (priest forced parishioner to have sex with him on at least two
occasions); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 846 (N.J. 2002) (defendant importuned plaintiff to
accompany him to gay bars); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
(parishioner forced to remove his clothes and was kissed and fondled by the cleric defendant).
190. See, e.g., Sanders, 929 F. Supp. at 1031-32 (adult parishioners); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.
2d 347, 352 (Fla. 2002) (adult parishioner); Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 923 P.2d 152, 156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (adult church volunteer).
191. See Buongirno, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2613, at *2; Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 352;
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 969 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998);
Roman Catholic Bishop of S.D. v. Superior Court of S.D. County, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1559
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Mirick v. McClellan, No. C-930099, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1994); Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
192. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) (church member claimed that the
pastor provided secular counseling and forced the church member to have sex with him as part of
therapy); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 442 (Me. 1997) (during
counseling, priest encouraged parishioner to delay her marriage ceremony and initiated a sexual
relationship with her); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Wis. 1997) (priest abused his
position as a hospital chaplain to engage the parishioner in a sexual relationship).
193. See H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92,94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
194. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. 1997) (catholic priest touched the
plaintiff in a non-consensual and sexually offensive manner during a seemingly trustworthy social
setting); Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Wis. 1995) (priest, acting in
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Clergy malpractice follows the same theory as

that of a secular counselor owing a duty of care to a patient. That is,
because of the patient's potential vulnerability, the counselor is in a
position to take advantage of the patient.' 96 Courts have firmly
recognized the urgency to protect those individuals seeking counseling
from predatory secular counselors. Accordingly, liability has been
imposed on those predacious secular counselors who injuriously breach
their duty of care.' 97 The foremost troubling aspect of this cause of
action is the impossibility of deciding without necessarily passing
judgment on the exactness of a particular religious position. 198 Courts
would be forced to create a reasonable standard of care on pastoral
counselors in which such a standard would be intertwined with the
ecclesiastical teachings of the religious organization.' 9 9 Because of the
varying theological beliefs espoused by the myriad of religions, it would
surely be impractical, and perhaps unconstitutional, to impose such a

reasonable standard of care.2 °0
The courts supporting this view are in agreement that a lawsuit
against religious organizations for this so called "clergy malpractice"
will inevitably interfere with religious practices and tenets and
commence a cycle where the State will obtain increasing control over
such religious practices. 20 For the justiciable purpose of keeping the
State from controlling our freedom to exercise religion, these courts
have allowed the First Amendment to act as a bar to tort claims of
negligent hiring and supervision when vicarious liability is claimed
his full capacity, developed a friend-like relationship with the plaintiff, which induced a sexual
relationship between them).
195. See Fenton, supranote 26, at 55-56. Generally stated, clergy malpractice has been defined
as a claim intended to redress offenses in pastoral advice or counseling. See id. It is more than mere
ordinary negligence in that it is directed at the professional activity of the clergymen. See id. at 56.
196. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 52, at 55.
197. See id
198. See Hammersley, supra note 33, at 626-27.
199. See id.The standard of care would be one of a "reasonable bishop" in which a court
would be required to actually interpret church dogma. See id.; Pritzlaff 533 N.W.2d at 780
("Negligence requires the court to create a 'reasonable bishop' norm."); see also Amato v.
Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 450 (I11.
App. Ct. 1997) ("To permit claims for clergy malpractice
would require courts to establish a standard of reasonable care for religious practitioners practicing
their respective faiths, which necessarily involves the interpretation of doctrine.").
200. See F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 707 (N.J. 1997).
201. Courts have uttered their concern that this cause of action would induce the court to coast
down a slippery slope involving arduous and unconstitutional questions of liability. See Schmidt v.
Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). But see Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th
Cir. 1994) (stating that sexual relations with a parishioner during ministerial counseling is not
within the scope of the minister's employment, thus the church could not be vicariously liable for
clergy malpractice).
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against religious institutions. On the other hand, there are many courts
opposing such a view by holding that claims for such torts are not barred
by the First Amendment. This view is discussed below.
B.

Case Law Preventingthe FirstAmendment from Barring Tort
Claims ofNegligent Hiringand Negligent Supervision

The Florida Supreme Court, along with many other courts, has held
that the First Amendment does not serve as a bar to claims against
religious organizations for the misconduct of their clergy. 202 As it was
stated in the majority opinion of Malicki v. Doe, the State, without a
compelling governmental interest, may regulate the conduct of the
clergy through neutral laws of general applicability. 20 3 The number of
jurisdictions accepting this view has been growing rapidly. One possible
reason for this increase in acceptance is that allowing for the church to
have free rein over the conduct of its clergy without any possibility of
state interference has caused the courts to develop a certain moral
blindfold in which these tort claims are simply not actionable.
Condoning the sexual misconduct of the clergy on vulnerable child and
adult parishioners has neither prevented nor decreased the amount of
reported incidents. Any sexual misconduct is inappropriate regardless of
who the alleged the defendant is. For instance, when a sexual harassment
claim is brought against an office employee, the plaintiff is not
prevented from asserting those negligence in hiring and supervision
claims against the employer.20 4 Thus, parishioners should not be
prevented from alleging virtually the same type of claim merely because
the wrongdoer is part of a religious sect.
Both Federal and State courts have refused to permit the First
Amendment to act as a defense against negligent hiring and

202. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002).
203.

See id. at 354.

204. See, e.g., Church v. Maryland, 53 Fed. Appx. 673, 674-75 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that an
employer is liable for its own negligence in failing to take timely and sufficient action to prevent or
stop the harassment); Beagle v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 232958, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 2283, at
*6 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2002) (stating that an employer can be liable for negligence in a sexual
harassment action if the employer knew or should have known about the alleged harassment and the
employer failed to take adequate precautions to protect against such misconduct); see also Capece v.
NaviSite, Inc., No. 03-02-00113-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8775, at *16 (Tx. App. Dec. 12, 2002)

(stating that an employer is directly liable only when the employer places its employee in a situation
that could foreseeably create a peculiar risk of danger to a third party because of the employee's
particular obligations).
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supervision. 0 5 While it is well established that the First Amendment
prohibits a court from intervening with religious affairs of the church, a
principle commonly referred to as the "Religious Autonomy
Doctrine, ''20 6 its activities "cannot be totally autonomous from the state
when it comes to matters of high order, such as health, safety, and public
peace., 20 7 Tort actions against religious groups do not offend the First
Amendment if those actions are based on solely non-religious
activities.20 8 Essentially, the claim is actionable if the alleged tort was
plainly outside the scope of the religion's practices and doctrines.20 9
Moreover, even though the First Amendment does not bar a claim
considered to be of neutral applicability, the cause of action for negligent
supervision is far less likely to conflict with the First Amendment.2
The tort of negligent supervision, in the context of liability by
religious organizations, is actionable only if the church hired an
incompetent individual and they should have known about the
individual's ineptness. 21' Both the Restatement of Torts 212 and the

205. For Federal cases see, for example, Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I.
1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic
Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 74 (D. Conn. 1995); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151
(E.D. Mich. 1995). For State cases see, for example, Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 &
n.9 (Colo. 1998); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (Colo. 1996);
Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997); C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (Wash. 1999).
206. See, e.g., Smith, 986 F. Supp. at 76. But cf McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 857 (N.J.
2002) ("churches are not-and should not be-above the law") (quoting Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
207. Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First
Amendment Considerations,89 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 7 (1986).
208. See H.R.B. v. J.L.G, 913 S.W.2d 92,98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
209. See id.
210. See Gibson v. Brewer, WD 50238, 1996 Mo. App. LEXIS 1182, at *25 (Mo. Ct. App.
July 2, 1996).
211. See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
212. A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while
acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is
privileged to enter only as his servant,... and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
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Restatement of Agency 2 13 recognize this doctrine, as do Prosser and
Keeton.2 14 Since only the regulation of religious beliefs is prohibited
from state interference, a claim for negligent supervision can bypass
First Amendment issues more readily. That is, supervising the clergy to
prevent unlawful misconduct can be regulated without the necessary
"excessive entanglement" with religious practices in order to raise the
First Amendment as a defense. Furthermore, some courts have
concluded that religious entities must be held accountable for their
actions whether or not their conduct is within the scope of their religious
practices. z15 This circumvents the reasoning that religious sects have a
duty to supervise and prevent foreseeable harm inflicted by those
members of the clergy who run the peculiar risk of engaging in such
misconduct.21 6 When the alleged wrongdoing of a cleric does fall outside
avail
the scope of his religious practices, however, that cleric2 cannot
17
himself of the protection provided by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, the court does not probe into an employer's reasons
for hiring a particular employee, but rather looks to whether the harm
could have been reasonably foreseen at the time of hiring.21 8 When
applying such a standard to a basis for hiring clerics, this inquiry is very
limited and factually based and can be accomplished without interfering
with religious beliefs. 21 9 In the absence of such interference, subjecting a
religious institution to potential tort liability does not impede their right
to the free exercise of their religion.220 The District Court of
Connecticut, in Nutt v. The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, asserted,

213. A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability
for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or in failing to make proper regulations; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of
harm to others;
(c) in supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by persons,
whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities under his
control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
214. "[A master] may, of course, be liable on the basis of any negligence of his own in
selecting or dealing with the servant ...upon familiar principles of negligence and agency law."
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 110, at 501-02.
215. See Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997).
216. See id.
217. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1998).
218. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 363 (Fla. 2002).
219. See Bear Valley Church ofChrist v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996).
220. See Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 79 (D.R.I. 1997).
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in support of its holding that the First Amendment does not create
blanket tort immunity for religious institutions, that it "has 'never held
that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.' ' 221 Furthermore, the Free Exercise Clause is only relevant if
the religious organization can manifest that the misconduct of its clergy
was undertaken in furtherance of a genuinely held religious
conviction.2 22 Consequently, the courts encompassing the view that the
First Amendment does not serve as a bar to litigation based on state tort
claims of negligent hiring and supervision wholeheartedly seek to
provide fairness to society by subjecting a religious institution to
liability for the wrongful actions of their clerics. Some cases with this
view may be as analytically strong as Malicki v. Doe, or they may
simply be seeking to promote the acceptance of solely one view on this
issue. Whatever the case may be, this view has had increased popularity
making it the more persuasive of the two views.
VI.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MALICKI

Since March 14, 2002,3 several courts, spanning over various
jurisdictions, published judicial decisions on this issue. As one can
probably surmise, the authority on this issue is still fiercely divided.
Before delving into the specifics of the subsequent decisions since
Malicki, this author believes it to be his obligation to hypothesize some
possible explanations for why the courts have not yet concluded more
uniformly. First, one cannot truly eliminate religious bias. To do so
would mean that we have read the minds of every judge that has taken a
particular stance on this issue and consequently conclude that each judge
was not biased at all. As enticing as that theory sounds, it is simply not
possible. Religious bias can appear in different forms. A judge can
demonstrate bias against religions, or a particular religion, by deciding
that the First Amendment is not a defense to the organizational tort
claims merely because that judge may not believe in religion or believes
in a different religion. In contrast, a judge can evince bias for religions,
or a particular religion, by concluding that the First Amendment does
serve as a bar to such claims solely because that judge is a devout
layperson who wants to help the religion maintain an angelic image.
221. Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 73 (D. Conn. 1995) (quoting
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)).
222. See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 358.
223. The day that the Supreme Court of Florida decided Malicki v. Doe. See id.
at 347.
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Second, somewhat related to the first theory, obstinacy may be prevalent
among judges whom have previously decided this issue and are riveted
in their past decisions regardless of whether they have been exposed to
information that could sway their vote. Lastly, there may actually be a
legal divide. That is, judges may be attempting to resolve this issue
solely based on neutral principles of law while avoiding (or
disregarding) any other unnecessary intangibles that could interfere with
their decisions. From this author's viewpoint, the combination of all
three theories makes for a logical resolution. With all that being said, the
journey into the analytical complexity of this issue shall continue.
Based on relevant principles of First Amendment jurisprudence, a
court, before barring a particular claim, must analyze every element of
the claim and decide whether adjudication would require interpretation
of religious dogma.2 24 As stated earlier,225 the claim is barred from
judicial review unless it can be resolved by the application of neutral
principles of law and without impermissible state involvement.226 Based
on the aforementioned principles, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in
McKelvey v. Pierce, held that the lower courts erred in dismissing the
plaintiff's claims because they failed to analyze each claim set forth in
the original complaint before determining that the First Amendment
barred the plaintiffs causes of action.22 7 In that case, the plaintiff, a
seminarian, alleged that while he was in the process of ordination into
the priesthood he was repeatedly thrust into uncomfortable situations of
immoral behavior. 228 The plaintiff alleged that he was importuned, on
several occasions, to engage in homosexual conversations and
behavior. 229 To his dismay, the plaintiff averred that the vocation
director neglected to take any corrective measures. 230 The plaintiff
withdrew from the seminary because of this alleged misconduct and thus
sued the Diocese of Camden under various causes of action.23 1
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the First
Amendment does not bar actions against religious organizations or
excessively entangle the courts in religion.23 2 In Odenthal v. Minnesota
224. See McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 856 (N.J. 2002).
225. See supra Section II.
226. See McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 856.
227. See id. at 857.
228. See id. at 845.
229. See id. at 845-46.
230. See id. at 846.
231. See id.
232. See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 441
(Minn. 2002).
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Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, the claim against the religious
institution was not based on the same sexual misconduct of the clergy
that occurs in the majority of the case law, i.e. sexually abusive behavior
of minors-usually male. Rather, the cleric, while acting as a marriage
counselor, preyed on the vulnerability of a woman who was desperately
in need of marital repair.233 The plaintiff alleged that the cleric
egregiously fiddled with the emotions of a susceptible parishioner
thereby abusing the counselor-counselee relationship. 234 As a result, the
plaintiff successfully claimed that the religious organization should be
liable for the negligent hiring and supervision of the cleric. 235 Recently,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided two cases, J.M v. Minnesota
District Council of the Assemblies of God 36 and Olson v. First Church
of Nazarene,237 which followed the same line of reasoning as the

Minnesota Supreme Court. In J.M, the respondent became more
actively involved in the church after she learned that her husband had
been diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.238 The respondent sought
spiritual counseling from Dvorscak, a minister at the church. 239 After
spending a good deal of time together, the respondent and Dvorscak
engaged in a clandestine sexual relationship.240 Eventually, this
relationship became known to the public and Dvorscak was asked to
resign. 24' Soon thereafter, the respondent filed a complaint against the
church alleging, inter alia, the negligent hiring, retention and
supervising of Dvorscak. The court, regarding the negligent hiring claim,
concluded that when claims involve "core" issues of internal church
discipline and governance, its precedent acknowledges that the
inevitable threat of excessive entanglement precludes judicial review.242
Essentially, the court noted that even though neutral principles of law
can be applied to a situation involving the known (or should have
known) history of the cleric at the time of hiring, inquiries involving the
appointment or discharge of a cleric are too fundamentally connected to
church dogma and governance.2 43 However, the court affirmed the
233. See id.at 430.
234. See id.at 431-33.
235. See id.at 429.
236. 658 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
237. 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
238. See J.M, 658 N.W.2d at 592.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 594 ("Liability for negligent hiring is determined by the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the hiring and whether the employer exercised reasonable care.").
243. See id.
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district court's denial of summary judgment on the negligent retention
claim.

244

In reaching its conclusion, the court maintained that the

standard for negligent retention is based upon neutral principles of
law.24 5 Additionally, the court only needs to evaluate what the church
knew or should have known about the dangerous propensities of
Dvorscak and whether the church's actions were reasonable regarding
the problem.24 6 Likewise, in Olson, the court of appeals analyzed the
situation under neutral principles of law. 247 In that case, the cleric and
congregation member engaged in a sexual relationship, which
subsequently resulted in a conviction for criminal sexual assault for the
cleric and a lawsuit against the church by the congregation member.248
The court asserted that negligent supervision claims are derived from the
doctrine of respondeat superior, so that a plaintiff must evince that the
employee's conduct occurred within the scope of employment. 249 Since
''sexual relations are a well-known hazard of a secular counseling
relationship" any inquiry into the reasonableness of the church's
supervision to prevent such hazard is permissible. 250 The Superior Court
of Connecticut arrived at the same conclusion. That is, the court held
that the religious organization's motion for summary judgment could not
be granted on First Amendment grounds.251 In that case, the evidence
suggested that the organization knew about the dangerous proclivities of
the priest as an alleged child molester.252 Since the organization
allegedly was aware of such prior misconduct, it was just to permit a
negligence claim against them pursuant to a neutral principles of law
analysis.253

244. See id. at 598.
245.

See id. at 597.

246.

See id. at 598.

247.

See Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
See id. at 259.

248.

249. See id. at 264.
250. Id. at 265; see also Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d
139, 146 (D. Conn. 2003). The District Court of Connecticut zealously stated that it "does not, will
not, and cannot sit as the reviewing authority for religious practices and doctrinal matters." Id.
However, as far as negligent supervision and employment are concerned, inquiries can be conducted
without excessive entanglement into religious tenets or practices. Additionally, since the plaintiff
broadly alleged negligent hiring and supervising claims, the court permitted those claims on the
basis that there was no excessive entanglement. Still, the court forewarned the parties to "carefully
limit the scope of [these] claim[s] to the secular matters of negligent hiring and supervision." Id.
251. See Doe v. Buongimo, CV000124271S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2613, at *20 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 30, 2002).

252. See id.
253.

Seeid. at*ll-12,*20.
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Since Malicki, three courts have concluded that the determination
of whether a religious organization acted reasonably in furtherance of
the hiring and supervision of its clergymen would excessively entangle
the courts in the religious doctrines of the organization and thus violate
of the First Amendment protections. The Washington Court of Appeals,
in S.H.C. v. F.M, strongly advocated in support of the First Amendment
barring judicial review of negligent claims against religious
organizations. 254 In that case, the plaintiff averred that she was duped
into having sexual intercourse with the grandmaster following a
religious consultation. 255 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the temple
claiming that the temple was liable for, inter alia, the negligent hiring
and supervision of the grandmaster. While it has been widely held that
the First Amendment does not immunize religious organizations from
tort liability, the court found that an examination into the dogma of true
Buddhist faith to decide whether the temple was negligent would
necessarily involve the excessive entanglement that First Amendment
jurisprudence prohibits.

257

Comparably, the Missouri Court of Appeals,

in A.B. v. Liberty United Methodist Church, refused to permit
adjudication of a negligence claim against a religious organization since
inquiring into the reasonableness of the organization would create an
excessive entanglement of religion and infringe upon First Amendment
protections. 258 The court reasoned that in order to prevent endorsement
of one particular model of supervision for churches, "we must be equally
zealous in protecting First Amendment civil liberties. 2 59 Furthermore,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Ehrens v.
The Lutheran Church-MissouriSynod, held that the First Amendment
bars any inquiry into determining whether ecclesiastical authorities
negligently supervised or retained a clergyman. 260 The court maintained
that permitting judicial intervention in order to establish standards of
care for the performance of such ecclesiastical work, "which is founded
in scripture

impossible.

and in history ...

' 261

is as unconstitutional

as

it is

The court also adopted the proposition that awarding any

254. See S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 179-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
255. See id. at 175-76.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 179.
258. See A.B. v. Liberty United Methodist Church, WD 59922, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 2500,
at *13-14 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002).
259. Id. at* 14.
260. See Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
261. Id.at333.
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damages would have a "chilling effect" since this could potentially lead
to State regulation of the future conduct of religions-a result wholly
violative of the Establishment Clause.2 62 Accordingly, the court
dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claims.26 3
This author's opinion can be regarded as a proportional mix of the
conflicting views. Recently, it appears that several courts that have taken
the view that the First Amendment serves as a bar to negligence in hiring
and supervision claims are beginning to have doubts concerning their
decisions simply because of the potential moral turpitude that could
emanate from those decisions. One concrete example of this
presumption comes from the Missouri Court of Appeals, 264 where that
court emphatically stated that it did not condone sexually abusive
behavior in the name of religion, yet it ruled that the First Amendment
barred negligence claims against the church simply because it was
following Missouri precedence.2 65 The court agreed that the result was
unsettling, but acquiesced to it merely because the law compelled such a
result.266 It seems that many courts are aware of its jurisdictional
precedence and are equally weary of the potential harm that could arise
by following the precedent. Based on this sole reason, it is this author's
opinion that the jurisdictions that currently bar negligence lawsuits
against the church for the misconduct of its clergy will eventually
reverse their precedent thereby permitting such claims to proceed to
trial.
This author wholeheartedly agrees that religious organizations
should be held vicariously liable for the torts of its clergy, despite First
Amendment protection. However, there are alternatives to the current
pleading standard, which is nearly the same among the several states for
common law negligence,2 67 that could provide the religious
organizations with sufficient protection against frivolous lawsuits
without having to hide under the umbrella of the First Amendment.
Since absolute tort immunity is nonsensical, and complete liability may
border on overly austere, there could be a uniform median standard that
262. See id.; see also supranote 157 and accompanying text.
263. See Ehrens, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
264. See A.B. v. Liberty United Methodist Church, WD 59922, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 2500
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002).
265. Seeid.at*14.
266. See id
267. For instance, in New York, when considering to dismiss a cause of action, the criterion is
whether the complainant actually demonstrates a cause of action, not whether he has stated one.
Such a determination is evinced from the factual allegations in the four comers of the complaint.
See, e.g., Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 372 N.E.2d 17, 20 (N.Y. 1977).
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would render just consideration. For instance, courts could judicially
create a heightened pleading standard for claims against religious
organizations that allege negligence in hiring or supervision.2 68 The
standard could be similar to that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b),269 which requires claims for fraud and mistake to be asserted with
particularity. At least one other jurisdiction has taken this approach.270
This is a truly viable alternative since the plaintiffs would be required to
plead with particularity that the religious institutions knew or could have
discovered through a due diligent investigation that the clerics had
dangerous propensities to engage in such flagrant misconduct. 271 This
could be evinced by either a past history of such misconduct, or by other
intangible evidence demonstrating dangerous behavior.272 Additionally,
mere constructive notice would be illogical, as well as insufficient, for
putting religious organizations on notice concerning the sexual
misconduct of their clergy.273 So, it is imperative to comport with that
heightened standard since the religious organization may never have
been able to foresee such incorrigible behavior. For example, suppose a
young gentleman enters the priesthood with a flawless record and was
socially perceived to be a warm-hearted individual. If that young priest,
somewhere down the road, were to engage in sexually abusive behavior,
it would seem unjust to permit a negligence action against the church for
an activity that it could never have been able to reasonably foresee.
Therefore, this heightened standard, albeit not a safe harbor from
liability, 274 would offer the church more protection than the standard
utilized by most jurisdictions today.
Permitting certain causes of action over the First Amendment
defense may evoke a discerning situation in that the potential for greater,

268. Mirick v. McClellan, No. C-930099, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 27, 1994) (creating a heightened pleading standard for claims against religious organizations
averring negligent hiring).
269. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
270. See Mirick, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816, at *9 (Ohio judicially created the heightened
pleading standard). Contra Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791,
794 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (stating that there is no statutory requirement that negligent hiring or
supervision causes of action be pleaded with specificity).
271. See Mirick, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816, at *10 ("In a claim for negligent hiring against
a church, the plaintiff must plead particularized facts that 'indicate that the individual hired had a
past history of criminal, tortious, or otherwise dangerous conduct about which the religious
institution knew or could have discovered through reasonable investigation."') (quoting Byrd v.
Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991)).
272. See id.
273. See L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 446 (Wis. 1997).
274. See Mirick, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816, at *11.
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more vexatious claims becomes more likely. If such were to occur, the
effect on the church, the particular religion, its followers, the
surrounding society, as well as the more distant society, could be
severely harmed-both emotionally and morally. For instance, if a
parishioner sues the Catholic Church for the torts committed by its
clergymen, numerous detrimental effects could be had on the Church. In
addition to those effects previously stated (e.g. onslaught of frivolous
lawsuits),275 the Church could suffer immeasurable damages. The reason
that this author refers to immeasurable damages and not simply
judicially awarded damages is because the Church is affected so
uniquely from these lawsuits that no single amount could portray the
detriment suffered. In fact, since religions are commonly viewed as
purveyors of good moral behavior they undergo strict scrutiny from the
public eye. When a religion is put under a negative spotlight, even the
276
slightest loss of public support harms that religion's internal economy
and reputation.
Moreover, the Church can suffer terrible reputational harm by
certain litigation. The news media, when reporting on sexual abuse by
the clergy, "'have grossly distorted the problem, and thereby left the
public [woefully] misinformed.' ' 277 As a result, the religion's reputation
is often dragged through the mud. Still, the worst effect occurs on a local
scale. Since it is often a particular church and not the religion in general
that is being reported on, that church will gravely suffer. For example, if
parishioners hear terrifying, yet inaccurate, news regarding their local
and beloved church (and/or clergymen), those parishioners may hesitate
to continue an association with that particular church. Even more
devastating is the fact that the harm does not cease there. If the local
church has affiliations (e.g. a school or sponsorship in a town feast),
those affiliates will also suffer since the domino effect will be in full
swing, i.e. a parishioner that ceases his or her affiliation with the church
will surely remove his or her children from the affiliated school.

275. See supranotes 263-65 and accompanying text.
276. The Church's "internal economy" refers to how it raises money. That is, soliciting
donations from parishioners at mass, etc. Since most of the Church's funds are given as donations,
any detraction from the normal amount will negatively affect the Church. See Weekend All Things
Considered, (National Public Radio Broadcast, Oct. 5, 2003), available at 2003 WL7254035
(declining donations for Boston Diocese has forced it to cut its budget sixty percent, close and
merge schools, and lay off employees).
277. Peter Steinfels, Beliefs; A Professor Offers a Critique of Legal Responses to Reported
Cases of Sexual Abuse by the Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at B5 (quoting Patrick J. Schiltz,
associate dean of the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis).
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Accordingly, such actions will immeasurably damage the religion itself,
as well as the local church under scrutiny.
One commentator, Patrick 0. Schiltz, has suggested that the Church
should organize a national tribunal, which would be composed of wellrespected laypersons, to arbitrate sexual abuse claims.27 8 In his plan,
dioceses would pay a fair compensation, as determined by the tribunal,
to any victims who are ostensibly telling the truth regarding their claims
and who are willing to forgo litigation. 279 That commentator believes
that this would save the church exorbitant amounts of money in legal
fees, resolve cases quicker and allow for the victims to keep all of their
compensation instead of turning over the obligatory contingency fee to
28
their attorneys. 8 While I applaud the novelty of this plan, I
wholeheartedly disagree with the form and substance of it. First,
circumventing the legal system to resolve legal disputes in an area of law
that is extremely volatile can promote nothing less than disorder.
Second, one of the most heated debates concerning the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment is that a state should not interfere with the
internal governance of a religion. Essentially, Schiltz's plan flies directly
in the face of that argument. That is, by setting up a national tribunal to
resolve these disputes, he is implying that the conduct of the clergy is
automatically secular, not ecclesiastical, and thus, is not deserving of
constitutional protection. Arguably, since the tribunal is not a State
function, there would not be any state interference, which would
eliminate any constitutional violation. However, it is this author's belief
that any potential impingement upon the internal church governance
should be solely in the discretion of the court system. Specifically, the
judge or jury should be the decision maker in determining whether, for
example, the First Amendment permits a plaintiff to sue the Catholic
Church for negligently hiring or supervising its clergy. Lastly, this
system would be markedly abused. On its face, this system promotes
lawsuits against the Church because of the great likelihood of procuring
settlements. In essence, this is an articulate way of defining "extortion."
The tribunal will pay off the "truthful" plaintiffs in exchange for them to
''go away." Although this system would conceivably save both parties
money, in the long run it harms the Church because it is not eradicating
frivolous lawsuits, but is encouraging them.

278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
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CONCLUSION

Clerical sexual misconduct and the resulting consequences from
such misconduct continue to be the subject of much fiercely disputed
litigation. 281 The issue of whether the First Amendment bars claims of
negligent hiring and supervision against religious organizations for the
misconduct of their clergy has not been uniformly decided among
jurisdictions.2 2 The primary reason for this split of authority is because
the courts do not have any supreme guidance. The United States
Supreme Court has not decided a seminal case, nor has Congress enacted
a statute to make clearer this resolve.28 3 The closest that the Supreme
Court has come to ruling on this issue is that it has firmly asserted that a
court may intervene only if neutral principles of law can be applied
without interfering in church policies and practices. 8 4 However, many
courts argue that the interpretation of church doctrine is necessary to
determine liability.28 5
In any event, the First Amendment does not expressly insulate
ecclesiastical relationships from judicial inquiry since doing so would
certainly "extend constitutional protection to the secular components of
these relationships. 28 6 Construing the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom to protect secular beliefs and actions would
impermissibly situate religious leaders in preferred standing in our
community.287 Following this reasoning, the courts that do not permit the
First Amendment as a defense for those tort claims have taken the more
legally, factually, and morally persuasive view. In the eyes of fairness,
any non-frivolous claim that arises from the alleged misconduct of a
cleric should be taken seriously and allowed to proceed through the legal
system. Since it has been widely recognized that religious institutions
are not immune from tort liability, 288 the amount of jurisdictions

281.
282.

See S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976).
See supra Section V.
Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998).
See id.

288.

See, e.g., Doe v. Buongimo, No. CV000124271S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2613, at *11

(Conn. Super. Ct. July 30, 2002) (subjecting the church to potential tort liability does not hinder
their right to free exercise of religion); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 844 (N.J. 2002) (holding
that the First Amendment does not immunize every cause of action against the church and its
clergy); S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the First Amendment
does not provide religious institutions with absolute immunity from liability for its tortious
conduct).
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accepting this view has and will continue to grow until the law is
uniform among all courts.
Lastly, I offer a concluding rationale for why this will be the case.
There are several important policy objectives to be aware of. First, steps
that a religious organization would take to protect its parishioners from
egregious predatory conduct of its clergy would not prejudice or impose
upon the religious tenets or doctrines of the Catholic faith. 289 This is

especially true since the predacious clergy would be violating the
church's own rules of conduct.2 90 Second, many state legislatures have
specified that child abuse prevention is of the foremost priority, and that
all instances of such abuse must be timely reported to the authorities
who should expeditiously take suitable action. 291 This form of legislation
is proper since a state may protect its children against pedophiles by
authorizing civil remedies against a church that intentionally or
negligently creates a situation where injuries are foreseeable.292 Third,
permitting these claims to proceed to trial will put the public on notice of
this type of potential risk. Finally, notice will be given to the members of
the clergy and to their respective religious affiliations that this kind of
misconduct will not be tolerated in the future.
ChristopherL. Barbaruolo*

289. See Buongirno, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2613, at *11.
290. See id.
291. See S.H.C., 54 P.3d at 179. Most states have enacted mandatory reporting statutes for
child abuse. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West 2002); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 32.11 (McKinney 1999).
292. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 971 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1998). This policy reason is analogous to a state that may prevent a church from offering
human sacrifices.
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